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In the New Economy, growth increasingly depends on the skills of the
labor force. Given education’s role in the development of such skills—and
the widely recognized shortcomings of our educational system—upgrading
America’s schools could boost economic growth. So it is not surprising that
the Bush administration has devoted a large part of its domestic agenda to in-
jecting a dose of market discipline into the public school system.
On Jan. 8, President Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001 (NCLBA). Together with the expansion of education IRAs as part of
last year’s tax cut, the NCLBA has the potential to significantly improve both
student performance and economic growth.
There is little doubt that the public school system in the United States falls
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Growth on the Border
or Bordering on Growth?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Texas–Mexico border tends to grow quickly
in terms of population and jobs. Gains in well-
being, however, are best captured by lower un-
employment rates and growth in real incomes. In
the past, border unemployment rates have been
among the nation’s highest, and border per
capita income has been about half the national
average. When border incomes have made
tenuous gains, progress has often been swept
away by a Texas recession or a Mexican peso
devaluation. Interestingly, border progress
in the late 1990s seems to have broken
with the past in many ways. The border
boom came about as the Texas and Mex-
ico economies grew in synchrony. Now,
with both economies stalling, some ques-
tions come to mind: What are the border’s
most recent gains? How were they achieved?
This time, are they here to stay?
Recent Gains in Border Well-Being
Falling Unemployment and Rising Income. As
the border economy grew in the 1990s, unemploy-
ment rates fell and incomes rose. Although the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .unemployment rate for the border cities
continues to be higher than the unem-
ployment rate in Texas and the nation,
the past decade witnessed record im-
provements. As Chart 1 illustrates, there is
a stark downward trend for unemploy-
ment rates across all border cities be-
tween 1990 and 2000. McAllen, which
has historically had the highest unem-
ployment rate among the border cities,
showed the greatest improvement. Be-
tween 1990 and 2000, the McAllen unem-
ployment rate dropped from 25 percent
in February 1990 to 12.5 percent in
December 2000, a 50 percent decline.
Laredo, which for the most part has had
the lowest unemployment rate among
the border cities, saw its unemployment
rate fall from around 12 percent in 1990
to its historic low of 6.3 percent in
December 2000.
Border unemployment rates have held
up well even in the current economic
slowdown. Although the Texas rate has
climbed to a six-year high of 5.8 percent,
the unemployment rates in El Paso, Laredo
and McAllen have remained flat or falling
over the past year. While unemployment
rates rose in early 2001 in Brownsville,
McAllen continued to see improvements,
with rates dropping throughout last year.
Laredo’s seasonally adjusted unemploy-
ment rate is back to 6.9 percent, where it
was a year ago, and the El Paso rate has
remained generally flat, rising slightly
from 8 percent to 8.2 percent between
March 2001 and March 2002.
Much like unemployment, income
levels on the border do not compare
favorably with Texas and U.S. averages.
However, like the changes in unemploy-
ment, border incomes also improved in
the 1990s. In fact, per capita income in
every border city except El Paso rose
faster than U.S. income between 1990
and 1999 (Chart 2). Border city per capita
income rose 12.7 percent in real terms
compared with 11.6 percent for the
nation. Laredo registered the most im-
pressive gains, followed by Brownsville
and McAllen. El Paso had the slowest
income growth of the four border met-
ropolitan areas, growing 9 percent in
real terms between 1990 and 1999.
What Explains Falling Unemploy-
ment and Rising Income? In general, un-
employment rates fell as jobs grew more
quickly than the population, and incomes
rose as two things happened: Wages in-
creased within certain industries, and
jobs grew in industries that pay relatively
high wages. As Chart 3 details, employ-
ment growth outpaced rapid population
growth in all the border cities, leading to
the declines in the unemployment rate.
Another important factor in the Rio
Grande Valley has been the declining
importance of agriculture. Farm work is
typically seasonal and low-paying. The
shrinking of the sector has reduced the
number of farm workers and contributed
to falling unemployment rates in McAllen
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Border unemployment
rates have held up well
even in the current
economic slowdown.
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Border Unemployment Rates Improve
Percent
Chart 1
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted.
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farm work has shrunk in South Texas,
opportunities for other low-skilled work
across the country have risen. This may
have led to out-migration of seasonal
workers from this region to year-round
employment in expanding industries such
as poultry production and processing in
the Southeast and meat packing in the
Midwest.
The rise in border incomes, mean-
while, can be traced to an increase in
average earnings, particularly in certain
growth  industries, as well as a rise in
employment in high-paying industries.
1
Key industries are determined by the
border’s unique function as gateway to
international trade and destination for con-
sumers from Mexico. As a result, there is
a larger than average share of employ-
ment in sectors such as government,
transportation, and retail and wholesale
trade. Transportation and government—
along with finance, insurance and real
estate (FIRE)—were the big growth sec-
tors that set the border apart from the
rest of the country by exceeding U.S. job
growth rates in the 1990s (Chart 4). All
three of these industries pay more than
the average border job.
2
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Border Per Capita Income Outgrew the Nation in 1990s
Real index, 1990 = 100
Chart 2














Job Growth Outstrips Population Increase in 1990s
Percent
Chart 3


















Mexico.Several of these industry sectors
were also among those experiencing the
biggest increase in earnings over the
decade. As shown in Chart 5, average
earnings per worker in FIRE, mining,
federal government and wholesale trade
grew at above-average rates (62, 34, 15
and 11 percent, respectively).
The expansion in federal government
employment, such as record growth in
the U.S. Border Patrol as part of a border
crackdown on illegal immigration, likely
led to the earnings increases in this sec-
tor. Ironically, while some border sectors
gain from keeping people out, others,
such as wholesale and retail trade, gain
from letting them in. The wholesale and
retail trade sectors are clearly dependent
on the inflow of Mexican shoppers.
Note, for example, the impact of the
peso devaluation in late 1994 on these
industry earnings (Chart 5). These sec-
tors do not begin to recover from this
shock until after 1996.
Interestingly, among all industries
over this time, the most impressive earn-
ings gains are made in the FIRE sector—
average earnings grew 62 percent be-
tween 1990 and 1999. The tremendous
growth in population, and an accompa-
nying increase in the demand for hous-
ing, contributed to this sector’s remark-
able growth.
3 As Chart 3 illustrates, three
metropolitan areas on the Texas–Mexico
border exceeded both U.S. and Texas pop-
ulation growth rates, while El Paso grew
faster than the United States (although
slower than the state).
Most of the border population
growth can be attributed to high rates of
natural increase (births minus deaths),
accounting for about 62 percent of the
population increase in McAllen and Laredo
and 77 and 98 percent of the increase in
Brownsville and El Paso, respectively.
There is also substantial international im-
migration, both legal and illegal, to the
border cities. Laredo and McAllen expe-
rienced domestic in-migration as well,
accounting for about 9 percent of the
population increase versus 29 percent
through international immigration in
both cities.
The border population boom fueled
a construction boom that brought down
the real cost of housing in almost every
border city during the 1990s.
4 Single-fam-
ily building permits increased 54, 53 and
57 percent in Brownsville, El Paso and
McAllen, respectively, between 1992 and
1999. A significant share of residential
building and home sales has been for
maquiladora executives and managers
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   SOUTHWEST ECONOMY   MAY/JUNE 2002 4
Share of Employment Growth by Industry in Border Cities, Texas and the United States, 1990–2000
Percent
Chart 4
NOTE: TCPU is transportation, communication and public utilities; FIRE is finance, insurance and real estate.
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and commute to work.
Despite Progress, Poverty Remains.
Despite above-average border income
growth in the 1990s, the decade did rela-
tively little to move border incomes
closer to state and national averages.
5 In
1999, the average Texas border city per
capita income was $14,737, compared
with $26,266 for Texas and $27,859 for
the nation. As a result, border poverty
rates are well above the national aver-
age, and the perception of the border is
one of chronic poverty.
What gets less attention, however, is
that a large share of the income differ-
ential can be explained by the demo-
graphic characteristics of the border
population. About 86 percent of the bor-
der’s (urban) population is of Hispanic
origin, compared with 32 and 12 percent
in Texas and the United States, respec-
tively. If instead of comparing the aver-
age border income with the national
average, we compare the average border
income with the average income of His-
panics in the United States, the income
differences disappear. According to 2000
census data, self-reported income per
household  member  among Hispanics is
$12,271, compared with $25,318 among
non-Hispanic whites. This is only a
rough comparison, but it illustrates the
point that border income per capita is
not markedly lower than elsewhere once
sociodemographic factors are held con-
stant.
On the other hand, explaining in-
come differences by simply stratifying on
ethnic origin does not get to the under-
lying reasons why border incomes are
lower. Border households are not only
more likely to have larger families, but
they are also younger on average—rela-
tively young people who have not yet
reached their full earnings potential.
Other factors contributing to lower in-
comes are low rates of labor force par-
ticipation, low education levels, elevated
school dropout rates and large shares of
the work force that are foreign-born and
have limited English fluency. Another
reason incomes on the border are low 
is because of the large population of
migrant workers, especially in the Rio
Grande Valley. Migrant workers travel to
the Midwest and Southeast during the
growing season. Their out-of-state earn-
ings are not captured by the border in-
come statistics used here, leading to a
downward bias in measured income.
Moreover, due to the lack of skilled
workers, few high-paying industries lo-
cate on the border.
6 Traditionally, this
region has drawn firms seeking low-
skilled workers, such as the apparel in-
dustry in El Paso or, more recently, call
centers in the Rio Grande Valley. The
agricultural sector, characterized by rela-
tively low earnings and only seasonal
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Average Earnings per Worker by Border Industry
Real index, 1990 = 100
Chart 5
NOTE: Border includes Brownsville, El Paso, Laredo and McAllen.























are well above the
national average,
and the perception
of the border is one
of chronic poverty.work, further depresses border per capita
income.
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How Were the Border 
Gains Achieved?
Historically, the border economy’s
success or failure has depended on the
strengths and weaknesses of the much
larger economies surrounding it. The U.S.,
Mexican and Texas economies have
alternated in the role of savior and villain
on the border. Of the four border reces-
sions since 1980, two have been the re-
sult of recessions in all three economies
(1982, 2001), one was just Mexico and
Texas (1986) and one—the 1995 Tequila
Crisis—was uniquely Mexican.
8 Chart 6
illustrates the extent to which year-over-
year border job growth fluctuated with
the U.S., Texas and Mexican economies
over this period. Again, the various bor-
der cities have fared differently during
the business cycles. Before the late 1990s,
Laredo employment growth was the most
procyclical by far, averaging a 6 percent
job loss in the recession years of 1982,
1986 and 1995. In the most recent reces-
sion, however, El Paso has been hardest
hit.
With all three economies growing
rapidly, particularly after 1995, it may not
be surprising that the border made sub-
stantial economic progress in the late
1990s. Notwithstanding, two things were
very different this time around: free trade
and Mexico’s macroeconomic stability.
When Mexico opened its economy to
trade by joining the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (known then as
GATT and now as the World Trade Orga-
nization or WTO) in 1986 and later
NAFTA in 1994, Mexico–U.S. trade grew
in volume and underwent rapid compo-
sitional change as well. Both develop-
ments benefited the border economy.
9
The increased volume of two-way trade
is processed on the border, not only by
U.S. and Mexican customs and many
other government agencies, but also by
transporters, freight forwarders, customs
brokers, insurance agents, bankers and
bridge operators. It is difficult to imagine
any business not directly or indirectly
affected by international commerce on
the Texas–Mexico border.
The compositional change in Mexi-
can exports, from raw materials such as
silver and coffee to manufactured prod-
ucts such as auto parts and electronics,
has also benefited the border by leading
to more rapid employment growth in ma-
quiladoras. Most maquiladoras are located
just across the border in the Mexican 
sister cities of Matamoros (Brownsville),
Reynosa (McAllen), Nuevo Laredo (Laredo)
and Ciudad Juárez (El Paso). Maquiladora
employment in these cities increased 83
percent on average during the 1990s.
10
Given the cross-border interdependen-
cies in retail, banking, insurance and real
estate, rapid job and earnings growth 
on the Mexican side leads to greater
demand for these goods and services on
the U.S. side.
Although all border cities have bene-
fited from liberalized trade with Mexico
and the growth of maquiladoras, their
individual experiences have been quite
different. For example, McAllen’s prox-
imity to the third-largest city in Mexico—
Monterrey—and the phenomenal maquila-
dora expansion in McAllen’s sister city,
Reynosa, both fueled McAllen’s growth
spurt. Laredo, through its unique location
along what is dubbed the NAFTA super-
highway, currently processes 40 percent
of land-based trade with Mexico. U.S.–
Mexico trade grew an average of 12 per-
cent per year between 1990 and 2000,
spurring Laredo’s growth. Brownsville,
strategically located on the Gulf of Mexico
with both a seaport and a tourism indus-
try, has similarly gained from the growth
in U.S.–Mexico trade and the inflow of
Mexican shoppers.
El Paso is a slightly different case.
With 40 percent of manufacturing em-
ployment in the apparel industry before
1994, the city’s economy was vulnerable
to NAFTA’s reduction of tariffs on apparel
from Mexico. In light of this, El Paso’s
relatively weak job performance in the
1990s (compared with the other border
cities) is actually impressive. El Paso has
undergone a structural change over the
past decade, largely driven by consum-
ers and industries in Ciudad Juárez.
11
Mexico’s Macroeconomic Stability
and the Strong Peso. One positive out-
come of Mexico’s 1995 recession was a
commitment to a stable macroeconomy
and the switch to a floating-exchange-
rate regime.
12 Such  a  regime does not
remove the possibility of a currency’s de-
preciation, but it does make large and
sudden devaluations more rare. Mexican
devaluations have devastated the border
economy many times in the past. Now,
however, the exchange rate regime is
accompanied by an inflation-fighting cen-
tral bank. Together with NAFTA-induced
increases in foreign direct investment,
particularly in the maquiladora sector,
these changes have led to a remarkably
strong Mexican peso in the years after
the Tequila Crisis.
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Border Recessions Driven by Surrounding Economies
December-over-December employment growth (percent)
Chart 6
NOTES: Data for 2002 are March-over-December, annualized. Border includes Brownsville, El Paso, Laredo and McAllen. Shaded areas
indicate border recessions.
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MexicoThe strong peso is another under-
lying reason for improvement in the
Texas–Mexico border economy. Despite
the recent economic slowdown, the peso
has not weakened much and continues
to play a vital part in the border boom.
Because the peso directly affects the pur-
chasing power of Mexicans, which in turn
influences the demand for U.S. goods
and services, its importance to the bor-
der economy cannot be overemphasized.
The peso’s strength has the most
direct impact on U.S. border retail sales.
Moreover, the manner in which the retail
sales level varies with the peso–dollar
exchange rate is a good measure of the
Mexican consumer’s influence on the bor-
der economy. As Chart 7 demonstrates,
retail sales in all four border metros
dipped sharply in 1994–95 as a result 
of the Tequila Crisis devaluation. The
downturn in the retail sector was partic-
ularly severe in Laredo. The 60 percent
decline in the peso’s value between Jan-
uary 1994 and December 1995 signifi-
cantly diminished Mexicans’ purchasing
power.
However, starting in early 1996, retail
sales began to grow again and, with the
exception of Laredo, have surpassed their
pre-1995 levels. As the largest city on the
border, El Paso has the highest county
retail sales. McAllen has the second high-
est and the fastest-growing. In addition,
McAllen leads in “exported” retail sales
—sales to Mexican nationals—largely as
a result of its proximity to Monterrey,
home to nearly 4 million people.
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Will Border Economic Growth 
Be Sustained?
In the past, border booms have
often come to an abrupt halt. The 2001
recession, however, does not seem to
threaten the ongoing border expansion.
This is due to fundamental improve-
ments in the underlying determinants of
border economic growth as discussed
above—such as macroeconomic stability
in Mexico and liberalized trade. Nonethe-
less, serious challenges still confront the
border economy. Simultaneous changes
in the maquiladora outlook, security meas-
ures in the wake of September 11 and
impending truck safety inspections will
all pose challenges for continued growth
and progress.
The peso’s strength, although a pos-
itive development in many ways, has put
more pressure on maquiladoras to save
on labor costs, perhaps by reducing em-
ployment by more than they would if the
peso were weaker or slowly depreciat-
ing. A strong peso increases the relative
cost of Mexican labor and makes labor-
intensive Mexican producers less com-
petitive. In addition, although the 2001
recession has been mild by both U.S.
and Mexican standards, it nonetheless
led to record layoffs in the maquiladora
industry. As of January 2002, 240,000
maquiladora workers had lost their jobs
in the previous year. This represents a
loss of 19 percent of total maquiladora
employment in just one year.
Even as the economic recovery takes
hold, there is speculation that not all
maquiladora workers who have lost their
jobs will be rehired. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that producers are taking ad-
vantage of the downturn to make changes
that will make them more competitive:
upgrading to less labor-intensive tech-
nology, expanding farther south in Mex-
ico (away from the border) or even relo-
cating to lower-wage countries in Central
America and Asia. All these changes im-
ply slower job growth on the Mexican
side of the border with some coincident
negative effects on the U.S. side as well.
Another risk to the border economy
prognosis is the crossing delays caused
by continued security measures as a re-
sult of the September 11 attacks. Security
measures implemented immediately fol-
lowing the attacks virtually halted cross-
border traffic. As random vehicle checks
were replaced by universal searches,
wait times doubled and tripled. At the
time of the terrorist attacks, vehicle cross-
ings were already down due to the re-
cession, after rising steeply throughout
the 1990s (Chart 8). After the attacks,
crossings dropped further. The falloff in
vehicle crossings entailed a drop-off in
the total number of northbound cars,
trucks and people. This, in turn, had a
negative impact on U.S. border cities for
all the reasons previously mentioned.
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Border Retail Sales Vary with Peso Strength
Real index, 1990:1 = 100*
Chart 7
* Seasonally adjusted.
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NOTE: Crossings are through Brownsville, Del Rio, Eagle Pass,
El Paso, Harlingen, Laredo, McAllen–Hidalgo, Presidio,
Progreso, Rio Grande City and Roma.
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The drop-off in northbound crossings
is perhaps best illustrated in El Paso,
where the recession has had a slightly
bigger impact than in the other border
cities. As Chart 9 shows, northbound
border crossings in El Paso fell drasti-
cally in spring 2001 and then again in
September. The decline in crossings seems
highly correlated with maquiladora lay-
offs, but given the drop in September
crossings and the lack of a rebound,
security checks and ensuing waits have
also played an important role.
It bears mentioning, however, that
further complicating border crossings last
fall was the required switch to a new
high-tech border-crossing pass, a so-called
laser visa, for Mexican commuters. Many
border crossers missed the deadline for
the conversion or simply could not
afford the $45 fee. The result was confu-
sion and fewer total crossings. Taken
together, these various factors have had a
negative impact on U.S. border econo-
mies like El Paso’s. The extent to which
retail sales have held up has been pri-
marily due to the peso’s strength and to
economizing Mexicans who now make
fewer trips and buy more on each trip.
A final upcoming challenge on the
border is the NAFTA trucking agreement
scheduled to come into effect this sum-
mer. Although the law is designed to
make cross-border trucking less cumber-
some by allowing Mexican trucks into
the U.S. interior, the law also mandates
extensive truck safety inspections and
stringent requirements for drivers. Truck
safety inspection stations are going up
all along the border. These stations are
to be placed on the actual border and
not at the perimeter of the border com-
mercial zone (typically 5 to 20 miles from
the Rio Grande). Northbound short-haul
trucks will probably be inspected along
with Mexican long-haul trucks.
Given the prominent use of short-haul
carriers for brief cross-border trips, and
considering that these vehicles are often
older and more worn, there is concern
that the inspections will cause longer
lines, delays and more congestion at 
border crossings. The U.S. Department
of Transportation has already said, how-
ever, that if an inspection facility be-
comes backed up with out-of-service
vehicles, they will close the facility until
it is free again to do more inspections.
In the medium to long run, the new
law and the safety inspections will be
positive developments on net—bringing
border trucks up to code and lowering
the cost of cross-border trade by elimi-
nating some of the short-haul industry.
In cities such as Laredo, however, more
streamlined trade will mean less need for
transportation services and warehousing.
These sectors have been big drivers of
the Laredo economy.
Conclusion
The Texas–Mexico border economy
did well in the 1990s. Border residents
saw greater employment opportunities,
improved earnings potential and higher
incomes. Texas border cities grew in size
and scope. This time, growth was based
on good fundamentals—a sound Mexican
economy and North American free trade
—that should secure future growth as
well. The border will see more changes:
slower population and job growth on the
Mexican side of the border, tighter secur-
ity and inbound Mexican long-haul trucks.
These changes can be positive if, for ex-
ample, slower population growth trans-
lates into higher living standards, if tighter
security is implemented through better
technology that does not extend border
crossing times, and if streamlined truck-
ing increases the flow and efficiency of
U.S.–Mexico trade.
Other developments not detailed in
this article played a vital role in border
well-being during the 1990s—increased
access to affordable housing, improved
health care, and more well-funded schools
and colleges. The border’s future must in-
clude continued investment in the human
capital of border residents through an
emphasis on access to these services,
most importantly education and job train-
ing. In the long run, raising income to
state and national levels can only be
achieved by upgrading the skills of the
border’s work force.
—P i a  M .  Orrenius
Anna L. Berman
Pia Orrenius is a senior economist and
Anna Berman is an economic analyst in the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
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El Paso Border Crossings
Decline Sharply as Maquiladora
Employment Falls
Number of crossings* Maquiladora employment*
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